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student. As a text-book it has the merits of a good style and the absence of that overcrowding with detail which mars the usefulness of some of the other volumes of the series.

Mr. Crozier's "History of Intellectual Development Along the Lines of Modern Evolution," in three volumes, called forth very favorable comment some years ago when the first volume appeared. The third volume is now published. It is in many respects superior to the first, though it scarcely merits the high estimate given that volume by the *Westminster Review*, that the work promised, "when complete, to be the most important work of the kind issued since Comte's 'Positive Philosophy.'" Mr. Crozier decided to publish his third volume before the second, because, as he says, of his anxiety to give to the public his practical conclusions on present day affairs. The subject matter of the present volume is from its very nature extremely vast and complicated. To treat great problems of modern civilization, politics, education, government, society, etc., in a single volume is a gigantic undertaking, and rarely attempted with success unless the author be a John Morley or a Gladstone.

The author's division of his subject suggests the practical character of the work, and the attempt to impress upon the reader the doctrine of solving the problems of the present and the future by an intelligent appreciation of the evolution of the past. Part I deals with the nineteenth century, Part II with the twentieth. The practical statesman is treated in the light of the political and economic ideals of the day, and the chapter on practical politics follows hard on the chapter on the evolution of civilization. What the author calls the twentieth century problem—in England, France, and America—has a chapter in the second part, with a corresponding chapter for the reconstruction and reform in each of these countries. The other two chapters of this part of the work deal with the problem of education, the first being on "The Bible of the Nations and Secular Education," the second on "National Education."

The style is lucid and strong, and the marshaling of the facts shows a remarkable insight into the significance of modern systems and institutions.

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Social Control. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, Ph. D. Pp. 463. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901.

In this volume Professor Ross has put important phenomena of social psychology under clear illumination. Professor Ross has long been recognized as one of the best writers on sociological themes. His

free and pleasing style is singularly well adapted to the exposition of problems that require not only clear statement, but also a happy choice of concrete instances and a neatly turned descriptive phrase. All of these qualities are found in the present work.

In various papers that have appeared from time to time in periodicals, Professor Ross has surveyed very nearly the whole field of social psychology. In the present volume he studies one part of it. An admirable distinction which our author made in one of his earlier papers divides social psychology into a study of social ascendancy and a study of individual ascendancy; the one dealing with the domination of society over the individual, the other dealing with the domination of the individual over society, through invention, leadership and the rôle of great men. The study of social ascendancy, in turn, Professor Ross divided into a study of social influence and a study of social control. Social influence includes the phenomena of the mob mind, fashion, convention and custom; in short, all social domination that is without purpose. Social control is that domination which is intended, which springs from a self-conscious knowledge of factors and tendencies of social life, and proceeds according to a plan. The volume in hand is concerned with this fourth division of the phenomena of social psychology. It is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with *The Grounds of Control*, *The Means of Control*, and *The System of Control*.

Of these three parts the most important is the first, comprising eighty-eight pages. In explaining the grounds of social control Professor Ross necessarily indicates the cardinal principles of that system of sociology which he accepts. He does not anywhere state these in formal terms. Such a proceeding would be out of harmony with his whole method of exposition, which is one of close attention to the subject immediately in hand. The attentive reader, however, will have no difficulty in discovering from the chapters on "*The Rôle of Sympathy*," "*The Rôle of Sociability*," "*The Rôle of the Sense of Justice*," "*The Rôle of Individual Reaction*," "*Natural Order*," and "*The Radiant Points of Social Control*," what our author's underlying scheme of social philosophy is. To this the critic should give his chief attention, for this necessarily determines the validity of all that follows.

In sympathy, sociability, justice and the spontaneous redress of injury, Professor Ross finds the origins of natural society, the foundations of a social order. This is his postulate, and in this he is of course in agreement with the great social theorists of all ages. If he made no advance beyond this time-honored truth the reviewer could say no more of his book than to commend its soundness. That which

gives its distinct individuality to Professor Ross's further exposition is his contention that these primitive elements in social phenomena are wholly inadequate to account for the higher stages of social evolution.

Sympathy, Professor Ross maintains, breaks down at the point where we are increasingly in need of security. "Our social development is marked by the progressive substitution of fixed impersonal relations for transient personal relations." It is not in friendly aid, but in reliable conduct that we discover the corner-stone of great organization. "Sympathy will stay the hand of the wife-beater, but it will not spurn the bribe, or spare the lie. It will snatch a child from trampling hoofs, but it will not keep the watchman awake, or hold the contractor to the terms of his agreement. It will nerve the rescuing fireman, but it will not stimulate the official to do his duty. It will relieve the beggar, but it will not stop the adulteration of goods. It will man the life-boat, but it will not lead men to give just weight, to make true returns of their property, or to slay their country's enemies." And in another place Professor Ross says: "It is *obedience* that articulates the solid, bony framework of the social order; *sympathy* is but the connective tissue."

To see this truth as clearly as Professor Ross sees it, and to state it so forcibly, is a genuine service to sociology at the present moment. Not less clear is our author's perception of the limits of sociability, or the love of companionship. It is among primitive men, and in the little groups of gentle, kindly, island folk, now rapidly undergoing extinction, that sociability is most highly developed. Among highly civilized peoples it is characteristic of the so-called Latin races. The Teutonic stocks, that have carried social organization in political and commercial forms to its highest development, are notoriously lacking in sociability. These stocks have attained to world domination largely through the self-sufficiency of the individual, his ability to lead a lonely pioneer life, to explore and to colonize. "The great social expansions have occurred, not in the most gregarious varieties of mankind, but in those races that have sense enough to perceive the advantages of association, and wit enough to construct a good social framework. While, therefore, the earlier groupings are natural communities, the unions of civilized men are artificial societies." And farther on our author says: "If we take up, one by one, the forms of union that are mighty and spreading in these days, we can see that each one of them owes its existence to something else than the charm of like for like. It is a commonplace of history that the unceasing agglomeration of communities has never been due to the mutual attraction of peoples, but always to conquest or to combination for defence. Not sentiment, but invariably force, or the dread of force,

has called into being that most extensive of co-operations, the state."

Among the bonds that supplement sympathy and agreeable comradeship, Professor Ross names first the sense of fairplay, or natural justice, and secondly, that natural resentment or spontaneous redress of injuries which enforces justice. Very clear and admirable is the exposition on pages 24 and 25, in which Professor Ross shows that the natural sense of justice is derived from the perception by one person that another person is essentially like himself, while it is the sense of difference that opens the door to greed and to oppression. Thus, while denying that the merely sympathetic elements of a consciousness of kind can create the higher modes of social union, Professor Ross finds in the intellectual elements the basis of a wider, and at the same time a more flexible, association.

Sympathy, sociability, natural justice and the spontaneous redress of wrong together constitute a natural society. Yet, collectively as singly, they are inadequate to produce the greater social systems, above all the modern industrial state.

The larger social structures are created then by social control, which Professor Ross, if I rightly understand him, regards as a consciously or deliberately created means to "supply" a "demand," to meet "a long-felt want." The want itself, or the need of an artificial social control, has its origin in the growth of private property, a great transforming force that acts almost independently of the human will, and which, in time, "violently thrusts men apart, in spite of all their vows to draw closer together." In other words, private property, by making men unequal, destroys the basis of natural justice, and compels men to seek means to create an artificial order.

These means lie at hand in the three parties of interest in every deed, namely, the doer, the sufferer, and the disengaged spectator; and in the corresponding three attitudes. These give rise to three bodies of feeling and opinion that, in combination, create social control. The three are: "That of those who wish to follow a certain line of conduct, that of those who are injured by such conduct, and that of the rest of the community." The second and third impose control, the first limits it.

Social control has behind it practically the whole weight of society. Still it "often wells up and spreads out from certain centres which we might term the radiant points of social control." These centres are determined by prestige. "The prestige of numbers gives ascendancy to the crowd. The prestige of age gives it to the elders. The prestige of prowess gives it to the war-chief, or to the military caste. The prestige of sanctity gives it to the priestly

caste. The prestige of inspiration gives it to the prophet. The prestige of place gives it to the official class. The prestige of money gives it to the capitalists. The prestige of ideas gives it to the élite. The prestige of learning gives it to the mandarins. The absence of prestige and the faith of each man in himself gives weight to the individual and reduces social control to a minimum."

I shall not attempt here to follow Professor Ross's interesting development of these ideas through Part Two on the "Means of Control," and Part Three on the "System of Control." Only by perusing the book itself can the reader gain an adequate idea of the wealth of discrimination, the grasp of principles, and the felicity of illustration in which these parts abound. I shall close my note of appreciation with one small bit of criticism.

It is a mistake, I think, to draw so sharp a line as Professor Ross does between natural and artificial society, and to present a view of the bonds of developed society as radically unlike those which hold together natural society, or to use Professor Ross's word, "natural communities." Has not Professor Ross here fallen into error because he has failed to adhere quite strictly to his own admirable analysis of social ascendancy? In the chapters on sympathy, sociability, justice, and individual reaction he depicts a régime that is essentially one of individual ascendancy or one of social influence, as distinguished from social control. The reader, therefore, naturally looks at this point for a chapter or two showing how the more or less unconscious régime of social influence, gradually undermining individual ascendancy, develops into social control. Those chapters are missing. Had Professor Ross written them I cannot help thinking that his distinction between natural communities and artificial societies would have disappeared.

Would it not have disappeared also if Professor Ross had looked for the common factor in such different social phenomena as the spontaneous kindness of kinsmen, the gathering of gold-hunters in a mining camp, the common obedience of a subject people to a conqueror, and the intelligent co-operation of a highly educated public in trying to realize an ideal? In the last analysis, all of these phenomena, different as they are, are common or like responses of many individuals, or of a multitude, to a given stimulus. Society becomes complex, its bonds of sympathy, sociability and natural justice are supplemented and interlaced by bonds of obedience, of fidelity, and of social service, not because an artificial régime is substituted for a natural one, but because, through a multiplication of stimuli, the like responses are multiplied, correlated and co-ordinated, and because, through this perfectly natural process, the unconscious social ascendancy which

Professor Ross calls "social influence," by almost imperceptible changes develops into that conscious social ascendancy, which he has so well named "Social Control."

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Poverty, a Study of Town Life. By B. SHEBOHM ROWNTREE. Pp. 437. Price, \$3.50. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901.

This work presents in a clear and forcible manner the condition of the poorer classes of York, England. Mr. Rowntree was impelled to the investigation, which was made in 1901, by the desire to see whether the conclusions of Mr. Charles Booth were applicable to a small city. Mr. Rowntree chose, therefore, his native city, York, whose population is about 77,800. In his research he had the advantage of Mr. Booth's advice. The result is one of the best studies yet made, though it does not pretend to cover the same ground as the great work by Mr. Booth.

York is stated to be an average city as regards general conditions. The industries are not highly specialized, and nearly every young man and woman can find employment. In the investigation it was sought to learn the housing conditions, earnings and occupation of every wage-earning family, not including, however, domestic servants living away from home, nor the servant-keeping class. This excludes a large part of the better class of wage-earners. The facts were ascertained regarding 11,560 families, comprising 46,754 people. There are no large tenements in the city and nearly every family has a separate cottage.

The picture Mr. Rowntree draws is not a bright one. Abject poverty, with seemingly no rays of hope, stands out in bold relief. For the sake of England and her commercial position, as well as for the individuals, the author rightly considers this a vital problem. After a careful consideration of the prices of necessities, it is said that the minimum expenditure for a family of four—father, mother and two children—is 18s. 10d. a week. This allows nothing for extras and assumes that every penny of the family income is carefully and wisely used. How often is this the case? 1,465 families, embracing 7,230 persons, were found living below this standard in what the author, rather infelicitously, calls "primary" poverty. This is equal to 15.46 per cent of the wage-earning class, or 9.91 per cent of the total population of the city. By "secondary" poverty is indicated those whose "total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency, were it not that some portion of it is absorbed by other expenditure, either useful or wasteful." The "other expenditure" is